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This paper examines the topic of reality from two philosophical perspectives: Pragmatism and Tibetan Buddhism underlining a deep similarity between the two camps. The contemporary pragmatist Richard Rorty argues that the traditional dichotomy of appearance/reality is fruitless and furthermore, the dichotomy entrenches us in the useless relativism/realism debate. Instead, Rorty offers the view of anti-representationalism. This view argues that knowledge can be useful or not but it represents nothing.
The Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa argues that reality can be understood in terms of the two truths. Ultimate truth and conventional truth. Ultimate truth is that no object has any essence or existence from its own side. Conventional truth is that objects, nonetheless, exist as conceptual constructs.
The final section is a comparison between Rorty's view and Tsongkhapa's. Here we see the obvious parallels between the two thinkers. Rorty denies that objects have any essence or "inside" to speak of. Tsongkhapa denies essence the same way. Rorty's anti-representationalism claims a 'middle way' between the extremes of relativism and realism while Tsongkhapa's two truths adopt a middle way between the extremes of nothingness (me-ta) and inherent existence (yod-ta). Tsongkhapa would agree with anti-representationalism and Rorty would agree with Tsongkhapa's use of the appearance/reality distinction.