The International Perspective

I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend my holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals.

Julius Nyerere, ca. 1961

From 1854 to 1857 Sir St. George Gore, a British nobleman, vacationed in the wilderness of the upper Missouri River. Gore traveled through what later became Wyoming and Montana with 40 assistants, 112 horses, 24 mules, six yoke of oxen, a large pack of stag-hounds and greyhounds, and three milk cows. He shot 2,000 buffalo, 1,600 deer and elk and 105 bears. From April 1909 to March 1910 ex-President Theodore Roosevelt vacationed in the wilderness of British East Africa. Roosevelt traveled through what later became the nations of Kenya and Uganda with 200 trackers, skinners, porters, gun bearers, and tent “boys.” Roosevelt and his son shot, preserved, and shipped to Washington, D.C., over 3,000 specimens of African wildlife.

In the half century between Gore’s safari and Roosevelt’s the United States changed from an exporter to an importer of wild nature. The changeover might be thought of as occurring in the 1890s when the American frontier officially ended and the cult of wilderness began (see Chapter 9). Previously, foreign tourists seeking wilderness found a mecca in the trans-Missouri West. St. George Gore’s trip exemplifies the efforts of wealthy and socially prominent Europeans to experience wild America while it lasted.


Contemporary Americans competed too closely with the wild to hear its call. Their relationship to it was that of transformers, not tourists, and they did their work well. By the time a later generation of Americans, represented by Theodore Roosevelt, became civilized enough to appreciate wildness, it had largely vanished from the American West. Africa became the new mecca for nature tourists like Roosevelt who were wealthy enough to import from abroad what had become scarce at home.

Thinking of wild nature as an actively traded commodity in an international market clarifies appreciation and largely explains the world nature protection movement. The export-import relationship underscores the irony inherent in the fact that the civilizing process which imperils wild nature is precisely that which creates the need for it. As a rule the nations that have wilderness do not want it, and those that want it do not have it. Nature appreciation is a “full stomach” phenomenon, that is confined to the rich, urban, and sophisticated. A society must become technological, urban, and crowded before a need for wild nature makes economic and intellectual sense. A Marxist formulation is tempting. There seems to be a social and economic class of nature lovers whose national affiliations are not as strong as their common interest in enjoying and saving wilderness wherever it exists. These people organize, confer, correspond, and raise money for nature preservation. A social profile of their ranks would reveal an inordinately high proportion of scientists, writers, artists—people of quality and the affluence to pay for it.

More than a metaphor is involved in nature importing; it has an economic value. Wildness is actually bought and sold and not for trifling amounts. Except in the case of trophies and the live capture of animals for zoos, nature does not physically leave the exporting country. The traded commodity is experience. The importers consume it on the premises. In addition, there are many armchair nature enthusiasts. Their eagerness to consume motion pictures, television specials, magazines and books about wildlife, and to

support nature philanthropy is an important form of nature importing. But wealthy tourists, following in the footsteps of Gore and Roosevelt, have been the mainstay of the nature business. Their willingness to pay heavily to see wild nature is a major factor in the economies of the nations where it still exists.

To extend the export-import metaphor, national parks and wilderness systems might be thought of as the institutional "containers" that developed nations send to underdeveloped ones for the purpose of "packaging" a fragile resource. Personnel sent to run the parks or to train native managers have a key role in the transfer of wilderness for money.

Although less utilitarian arguments certainly do exist, in actual fact money is the most important reason for preserving nature in most cultures. As the scope of the Gore and Roosevelt trips suggests, nature exporting can be lucrative. It subsidizes nature preservation. Less developed countries can afford to maintain wilderness, while necessarily restraining development, if the exportation of nature pays sufficient dividends. A poster intended for natives in Africa makes the point explicitly: "OUR NATIONAL PARKS BRING GOOD MONEY INTO TANZANIA—PRESERVE THEM." Local people are reminded, for instance, that an adult male lion in Amboseli National Park in Kenya generates $515,000 in tourist revenue over the course of its lifetime. For a poacher, the meat and skin might bring as much as $1,150. On the basis of the revenue they generate by attracting tourists, lions or elephants may be the most valuable animals in the world, race horses included.

The tension between the nature exporters and the nature importers is historic and continuing. It should be clear that the exporters do not as a rule recognize the marketability of their product. Africans, for example, have lived with wild animals as long as they can remember. You cannot interest a Masai in seeing and photographing a giraffe any more than you can interest a New Yorker in a taxicab. Similarly, the restrictions on grazing and farming in an African park or preserve are as perplexing to the natives as a law that prevents a New Yorker from living in and using ten square blocks of midtown Manhattan would be. Not sharing the developed world's conception of the value of wild nature, the less developed world sees no reason not to continue to exploit resources in the accustomed manner. But as Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere's remark opening this chapter suggests, if incomprehensible foreign tourists want to travel thousands of miles just to look at wild animals, and especially if they spend money in the process, exporters will not protest.

Exporting and importing nature also has a regional or intra-national significance. The urban segment of a population may support preservation of wilderness in hinterlands, the inhabitants of which are indifferent or actively hostile. In the United States, the East and civilized islands in the West, like San Francisco, reached the nature importing stage several generations before the still wild West. The first nature tourists came from these areas. So did the first stirrings of the nature preservation movement. Henry David Thoreau and Theodore Roosevelt were Harvard men. John Muir, like Sir St. George Gore, came from Great Britain, and when he organized the Sierra Club in 1892 it was dominated by an elite from Berkeley and San Francisco.

Parallels exist throughout the world. The concern in Tokyo protects what wilderness remains on Japan's northernmost island, Hokkaido. Australia's outback is of primary interest to residents of Sydney and Melbourne. The Malaysian Nature Society has little support outside the nation's metropolis, Kuala Lumpur. The national parks of Norway and Sweden are the concerns of urban people in the southern portions of those countries. And, to return to the American experience, nature preservation efforts in Alaska have been led by outsiders from the rest of the United States. Robert Marshall, for example, was a classic nature importer, amply endowed with the money and free time to indulge his passion for wilderness during the depths of the Great Depression.

In stating this thesis graphically the economists' concept of marginal valuation is useful. The vertical axis in the figure below measures the value a society or nation attaches to an extra unit of the commodity or experience in question. The horizontal axis mea-


CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD NATURE AND CIVILIZATION WITH DEVELOPMENT

Marginal Valuation

High

Medium

Low

Nature Exporting

Nature Importing

Degree of Development (Time)

Scribes the degree of economic development in the society and is roughly equivalent to historical time. Read from left to right the graph shows what happens to the relative valuation of wild nature and civilization as a nation undergoes development. Initially the marginal valuation of civilization is much higher than that of wildness. Wildness at this stage is so abundant as to constitute a threat to the society. This condition favors nature exporting. With the passage of time, civilization becomes plentiful and nature scarce. The marginal valuation of each changes. After the curves cross, society values increasingly rare nature more than it values now plentiful civilization. Henceforth it is civilization that constitutes the threat to people's mental and physical well-being. This situation encourages nature importing. The widening vertical distance between the curves to the right of the graph may be taken to represent the growing amount of nature appreciation.

Until very recently traveling for pleasure almost always entailed movement from less civilized to more civilized areas. The trapper or farmer came out of the woods for a few days of fun in the biggest city available. If people traveled in the other direction their purpose was invariably to transform wilderness into civilization in the manner of the Pilgrims and the Mormons. No one went to New England or Utah in the early years for recreation. The intellectual revolution that made unmodified nature per se a mecca for travelers is the principal subject of this book. It depended upon the emergence of a group of affluent and cultured persons who resided in urban environments. For such persons wilderness could become an intriguing novelty and even a deep spiritual and psychological need. But the civilized conditions that cause interest in wilderness also destroy it. Travel was the solution.

If wild country no longer existed close to home, one could, given sufficient wealth and leisure, find it elsewhere. The procession of English tourists to the Alps was the first major instance of nature importing as a social and intellectual movement. Stimulated by the descriptions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 1760s, and later by the new aesthetics of John Ruskin, English travelers crossed the Channel to find in France, Switzerland, and Italy what their homeland could not provide. By the middle of the nineteenth century, tourism had evolved into mountaineering. The decade after 1854 was the golden age, with the first ascents of 180 peaks in the Alps, including, in 1865, the Matterhorn.

Englishmen of privileged social and economic backgrounds predominated in the new sport. Significantly the local people who lived in the Alps initially had no interest in mountaineering. The natives feared and hated the high country, avoiding it whenever possible. Only when it became apparent that money was to be made by assisting foreigners climb did the legendary alpine guide stride forth with rope coiled and hand outstretched. Even then, the attitudes of the importers and the exporters toward mountains remained far apart. What was pleasure for the visitor remained strictly business for the locals.

8. The first nature tourists are well described in Bruce C. Johnson, “The Leader Must Not Fall: A Sociological Analysis of Mountain Climbing,” (unpublished manuscript prepared in the Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego, 1977), especially Chapter 2; Brian Dunning, “In the Beginning the English Created Mountaineering,” Mountain Gazette (April 1973), 8; Gaven de Beer, Early Travelers in the Alps (New York, 1967); Ronald Clark, The Victorian Mountaineers (London, 1953); Claire Engel, Mountaineering in the Alps (London, 1971); and Arnold Lunn, Switzerland and the English (London, 1944).

The Alps had the advantage of proximity, but for the European importer of nature in the nineteenth century the western territories of the United States held special fascination. The New World still had real wilderness—unsettled country with wild animals and wild people. The difficulty and expense associated with travel on the American frontier acted as a filter for visitors. Importing wilderness from North America remained for a half century a special treat reserved for royalty and the extremely rich. A growing number made the investment. One of the first was François René de Chateaubriand who in 1791 found New York state sufficiently wild to fire his romantic imagination (see above, pp. 49-50). His countryman, Alexis de Tocqueville, came forty years later and followed the fast-moving frontier all the way to Michigan to find wilderness. Tocqueville's remarks (above, p. 23) are a classic explanation of the nature exporting and nature importing perspectives.

As late as the 1870s almost all the nature tourists on the American frontier continued to be foreigners. Americans went west for science and discovery, for fur and gold, to fight Indians and secure homesteads. The foreigners were there for fun. Their pioneering was in wilderness appreciation. So Prince Maximilian traveled up the Missouri in 1833 strictly as a tourist. In this precamera age, he brought along a Swiss artist, Karl Bodmer, to record the sights. The German Heinrich Balduin Möllhausen accompanied Duke Paul William of Württemberg in a similar capacity on an 1851 pleasure trip to the Missouri headwaters. The Duke, known as "the gypsy Prince," had traveled in the wild West as early as 1822, but the trip with the artist turned into a survival situation with Indian attacks and starvation. Subsisting on frozen wolf meat, Möllhausen still managed to return with some creditable paintings. Sir William Drummond Stewart, heir of one of the oldest and wealthiest families in Scotland, returned to the American West repeatedly in the 1830s and 1840s. His retinue in 1843 consisted of some thirty "gentlemen," the same number of "hunters," and 120 horses and mules. Six years earlier, at the annual trappers' rendezvous, Stewart presented the legendary mountain man Jim Bridger with a full suit of armor. In their relation to wild nature, the men stood at opposite ends of the spectrum. Bridger was in the West to harvest the remaining beaver and profit from an expanding civilization.

In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, what Earl Pomeroy calls "the Far Western hunter-tourist" became increasingly common. The tales of Sir St. George Gore, as told by an uncle, inspired Windham Thomas Wyndham-Quin, the Fourth Earl of Dunraven, to import the wilderness of the West. In 1871 Dunraven hunted the Nebraska plains guided by Buffalo Bill Cody and Texas Jack Omohundro. Three years later Omohundro led the Earl through northwestern Wyoming. Dunraven harbored no illusions about his purposes. In one of the earliest instances of the use of the word, he calls himself a tourist. Hunting was not the primary reason for his trip but rather "the satisfaction of my curiosity and the gratification of my sight-seeing instincts." William A. Baillie-Grohman was the most persistent of all the late nineteenth-century importers of American nature. Beginning in the late 1870s, this wealthy English sportsman and alpinist made no fewer than thirty trips to the Far West and British Columbia. It is clear that he sought in North America what he could no longer find in Europe. For two decades Baillie-Grohman had hunted close to home, "killing my first deer in the Alps before I was ten years old." But the Old World could not satisfy his thirst for wilderness. He longed "to make the acquaintance of the great Mountain System of the New World, the home of such lordly game as the grizzly, the bighorn, and the wapiti—the latter our own stag, produced on a wholly magnificent, one might say American scale."
Bailie-Grohman's expeditions mark the concluding phases of the individualized safari in the West. Thereafter most tourists used the services of commercial travel companies such as those of Thomas Cook and Walter Raymond. But even on these standard tours, the West's great attraction was its wilderness. Certainly no European would journey to Arizona or Wyoming in 1900 to see cities, museums, and churches. But Indians, the Rocky Mountains, Yosemite and the Grand Canyon were compelling. Nature, not civilization, was the actively traded commodity between America and its foreign visitors.  

Given the ambitions of a growing United States and the absence in the nineteenth century of an effective nature protection movement, the pleasure of nature tourists was inevitably transitory. Environmental conditions changed rapidly. In his account of 1882, Bailie-Grohman is overjoyed and overwhelmed with the wildness, the vastness, and the abundance of the region. Big game was plentiful, and the avowed object of his early trips was trophy hunting. Bailie-Grohman depicted the West as the mecca of the lover of wilderness. But his book of 1890 reflects the change brought about by the accelerating expansion of American civilization. Bailie-Grohman devotes a chapter to the careless slaughter of buffalo and elk. In his view, "railways, ranchmen [sic], and miners have taken possession of what was once the sportsman's paradise." The wilderness relished by early tourists had vanished. "Many parts of Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho are still worth visiting for the sake of sport," Bailie-Grohman concluded, "but the old glory of those states is gone never to return."  

From this perspective national parks acquired importance as a means of keeping at least a symbol of a wild region's old glory alive. Significantly, the world's first national park, Yellowstone, protected a part of the northwestern Wyoming that Gore, Dunraven, Bailie-Grohman, and other foreigners prized. Moreover, the men responsible for conceiving of the national park idea and pushing it through Congress in 1872 were, without exception, nature importers from the eastern states. George Catlin, the first (in 1832) to advocate creation of a nation's park in the Rocky Mountains, was a Philadelphia artist. Cornelius Hedges, whose 1870 trip through the

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16. For a discussion of the evolution of travel in the West from the expedition to the tour see Pomeroy, Golden West, Chapters 2 and 3.  
parks such as Yellowstone were no substitute for the quality and quantity of wilderness that St. George Gore experienced in the 1850s. Inexorably, a developing America was maturing and changing in the process from a nature exporter to a nature importer. While it lasted, the West's resource of unmodified nature had been systematically exploited by tourists from abroad and from the East. By the turn of the century the importers were looking for new frontiers, and the successor to the wild West was Africa.

Buffalo are an index to the change. By the time of Theodore Roosevelt's first western trip in 1889, the buffalo were making their last stand. Hunting, fencing, and the general expansion of settlement had reduced a population of from sixty to seventy-five million animals to a few hundred. The year 1889, in fact, saw the last commercial buffalo hunt on the Great Plains.22 After a week's effort in the Dakota badlands, Roosevelt and his guide finally found one lonely buffalo to shoot, but the New Yorker was puzzled and saddened by the scarcity of game.23 Anticipating the future, Roosevelt turned to ranching and, for wildness, to Africa.

Theodore Roosevelt's widely publicized 1909 safari to East Africa actually followed a well-beaten trail of nature importers from countries that had used up their wilderness earlier than had the United States. The publicity surrounding the search of H. M. Stanley for David Livingstone in 1871 triggered a surge of interest in Africa as a dark, wild continent. As early as 1894 British authorities on hunting, such as Clive Phillips-Wolley, spotlighted Africa as the successor to India and the western United States as a sportsman's paradise. Bitterly, Phillips-Wolley told how meat hunting and disregard of game laws by local people had ruined opportunities in many parts of the world for "the alien who pays for his sport."24 Similarly, Parker Gillmore returned to the American West in the 1870s and was shocked at the changes. "Alas! how altered, how changed, had the great Western continent become! West! farther west, still farther west, I pushed my way, but the game had gone to the spirit-land... grizzly bears, where they had once been numerous, had entirely disappeared and the weird voice of the wolf was unknown."

Sadly Gillmore returned to his native England "wondering how I could kill time." The mail brought an answer in the form of an invitation to a year-long hunting trip in Africa. Without a moment's delay, Gillmore, the classic nature importer, agreed to a sporting adventure on the new frontier.25 C. J. "Buffalo" Jones, the renowned American cowboy, responded similarly in 1910 when he left a West that had become "stale to [him]" for "other worlds to conquer" in Africa. Jones proposed to capture African lions and rhinoceroses.26 Even the vicarious wilderness adventurer gave up on the American West. Edgar Rice Burroughs led the way in 1913 by making Africa the locale of his enormously popular Tarzan sagas.

But it was increasingly clear from the American experience that even in Africa nature importing would not be possible for long without nature protection. The most sophisticated of the early calls to save wild Africa came from Abel Chapman, an English gentleman-hunter who began importing wildness from Norway and Spain before moving on, in 1899, to the dark continent. Chapman devoted an entire chapter of his book On Safari to the protection question. He began by noting the "abominable massacre" of the American buffalo in the 1880s and the destruction of Norway's reindeer herd in the following decade. His intent was to "make such barbarities impossible at least on British soil." Significantly, in view of the early date of his statement, Chapman clearly recognized the export-import situation and its importance to the economy of Africa. "As a simple matter of fact," he wrote in 1908, "the traveller-sportsman was (and still remains) the best customer of the Colony; while the game is still its best asset." Yet, ambivalently, he also admitted that game protection should not stand in the way of "the necessities of white settlement and colonization." Chapman's point

was that many parts of Africa were unsuited to development and could be dedicated to "God's beautiful wild creatures." Chapman, to be sure, killed game, but in company with most of the importers of his era he defined himself as a sportsman and he supplied his own definition of that term: "One who loves the game as though he were the father of it." 27

Theodore Roosevelt was in the vanguard of sportsmen who urged the conservation of wildlife and its habitat around the world. In 1909, the year he began his safari, Roosevelt published an introduction to William Baillie-Grohman's edition of a medieval hunting classic, The Master of the Game. He acknowledged that there were still a few remote places where one had to hunt in order to eat and where settlers had to "war against the game" in the manner of primitive man. "But," Roosevelt stated, "over most of the earth, such conditions have passed forever." People who loved the wild as Roosevelt did realized that only their determination, and their money, stood between it and the pressures of an expanding technological civilization. "Even in Africa," Roosevelt stated in 1909, "game preserving on a gigantic scale has begun." 28

The preservation of game animals in Africa is an excellent illustration of nature exporting and importing at work. Colonization made it easy. Developed nations found themselves in control of a huge area rich in wildness which had been exhausted at home. The logical next step was to protect nature in Africa so that it could be enjoyed by people from Europe. Efforts in this direction first appeared in England in the 1890s. By 1899 a series of general propositions had been drafted, and on May 19, 1900, seven European nations signed draft articles concerning nature protection in Africa. They proposed regulations on hunting licenses, closed seasons, and methods of capture. Schedules itemized species that would enjoy complete protection (the gorilla, giraffe, and chimpanzee are examples) and, invoking a philosophy repudiated by later ecologically minded preservationists, "noxious" forms of life that should be exterminated (crocodiles, dangerous monkeys, pythons). An attempt


the United States for all the literature available on the national parks and studied the methods of their first director, Stephen T. Mather. Stevenson-Hamilton took special note of how Mather interested railroad companies in the parks by demonstrating their potential for attracting tourists. Finally, in 1926, the precarious Sabi Game Reserve became Kruger National Park. The telling argument, advanced by the Minister of Lands, Piet Grobler, was the financial success of the American initiative in nature protection.31

Only one other major national park was established in Africa earlier than Kruger and it also owed much to the American example. A catalytic event which lead six years later to the creation of Albert National Park in the Belgian Congo was the visit of King Albert of Belgium to the American West in 1919. The American scientists who accompanied Albert on parts of his journey, John C. Merriam and Henry Fairfield Osborn, Sr., made sure the King appreciated the scientific importance of national parks like Yosemite.

In so doing the Americans practiced a favorite technique of nature importers: inspiration by good example.32 Back in Europe, King Albert faced a dilemma. The American parks had inspired him to do something comparable in Belgium, but wilderness had disappeared from that country centuries before. In Africa, however, the wild was alive and well, and Albert ruled over part of it: the Belgian Congo.

At this point enters an American who knew the Congo as well as any white man and loved its remote interior as one of the last unmodified African environments. Carl Akeley was a taxidermist and designer of exhibits of large mounted animals at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. In 1910, just as Roosevelt’s safari concluded, Akeley began extended field studies of the African elephant. His next project concerned gorillas and brought Akeley to the Congo. By 1912 he was convinced that without protection the few hundred remaining gorillas were doomed. Communicating with Belgian authorities, Akeley advocated the establishment of a sanctuary and a biological research station. John C. Merriam, who had been with King Albert in 1919, intervened on behalf of Akeley’s ideas. On March 2, 1925, they bore fruit when a royal decree established Albert National Park.33 Later expanded to six million acres, the park was unusual in emphasizing science rather than tourism. Since only trained researchers would be admitted, the reserve could not meet the needs of nature importing tourists. But as a nature sanctuary guarded from local exploitative pressure by a multinational board of scientists, Albert National Park provides classic evidence of the different perspectives underlying nature exporting and importing. In this case it was the idea that the world’s last gorillas were safe that was the saleable commodity. For a scientist like Carl Akeley the park was almost a private reserve. It also became a cemetery. Akeley died in November 1926 on an expedition to the park he had done so much to create.34

The effectiveness of Carl Akeley and John C. Merriam in convincing Belgium to establish Albert National Park was not entirely circumstantial. Thanks to Yellowstone (1872), Yosemite (1890), the National Park Service Act (1916), the Forest Service initiatives in wilderness designation in the 1920s and 1930s and, later, the Wilderness Act (1964) and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (1980), the United States has maintained a reputation as the world’s foremost protector of wildlife and wilderness. Time and again the American example inspired preservationists in other countries. In Japan, for example, the first proposals for national parks followed the visits of nineteenth-century students and tourists to Yosemite and Yellowstone. Then, in 1914, a twenty-four year old Japanese student and mountaineer, Ryozo Azuma, called on John Muir at his ranch in Martinez. Depressed after the Hetch Hetchy defeat, Muir would have only a few more months to live, but he entertained Azuma for two days. Even though Azuma was already familiar with most of Muir’s writings, he was overwhelmed by the visit. "The deep spiritual influence I had from John Muir," he later wrote, "has dramatically and decisively directed the way for

31. Ibid., pp. 113, 120.
33. The reserve has now become Virunga National Park in Zaire and Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda.
my whole life.” What Azuma meant is that he went on to become a major interpreter of American life and institutions for the Japanese, writing two dozen volumes including a biography of John Muir. Azuma also worked with Tsuyoshi Tamura, who had visited Yosemite and met Stephen T. Mather. In 1931 Tamura pushed into law a bill creating a national park system for Japan. Azuma traveled over the world but returned to Japan only to lose his government job during World War II because he refused to remove from the walls of his office posters with photographs of parks and wilderness areas of the United States.

The idea of international collaboration to protect wild nature in the less developed parts of the world also had American roots. Following their 1908 triumph in publicizing conservation at a White House conference, Theodore Roosevelt and Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot called a North American Conservation Conference. At its February 1909 meeting the delegates resolved to work for a world conference the following September in Holland. Before he left office, President Roosevelt sent invitations to fifty-eight nations, but his successor, William Howard Taft, dropped the project. But Paul Sarasin, a Swiss zoologist, continued the campaign for an international commission having a “mission to extend protection of nature to the whole world from the north pole to the south pole, covering both continents and seas.” In 1911 the Swiss government appointed a committee of internationally respected scientists and simultaneously issued a call for an International Conference for the Protection of Nature which convened in Basel in November 1913. Delegates from sixteen nations (not the United States) participated. Their initial resolves concerned the establishment of an information-clearing house and a propaganda agency for nature protection everywhere in the world. Everything collapsed six months later, however, with the outbreak of the First World War. Even in 1923, when


Switzerland tried again with an international conference held in Paris, it was clear that Europe was not ready to think seriously about international nature protection when more basic human problems remained unsolved. Environmental preservation remained a full stomach phenomenon.

After Paul Sarasin, P. G. Van Tienhoven assumed leadership of the crusade to institutionalize international nature protection. Van Tienhoven, who was a Dutchman, organized in 1925 and 1926 committees for the international protection of nature in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. On July 10, 1928, he established, under the auspices of the International Union of Biological Sciences, an International Office for the Protection of Nature based in Brussels. Its function was restricted to information-gathering and, like Paul Sarasin’s committee, it eventually fell victim to the disruptions associated with another world war. For a few years, though, in the early 1930s, institutionalized global nature protection enjoyed its finest hour. At Paris in 1931 the Conseil International de la Chasse held a meeting centered on the conservation of birds throughout the world. In the same year Van Tienhoven organized an International Congress for the Protection of Nature. The delegates resolved that the rest of the world should resume the effort to save wild nature in Africa.

Similar concern motivated the American Committee for International Wildlife Protection which took shape in 1931 in response to Van Tienhoven’s initiative. John C. Phillips, a gentleman conservationist-hunter and brother of the American ambassador to Great Britain, chaired the committee; Harold J. Cooledge, Jr., was its first secretary and primary spokesman. These men and their board of directors were generally affluent, well-traveled, and connoisseurs of the beauty of wild nature wherever it existed in the world. Recognizing Africa as a threatened resource of wild nature, the committee produced a handsome special publication entitled African Game Protection. It listed the national parks and game reserves in Africa and discussed threatened species.

The high point of institutionalized global nature protection before the Second World War came on October 31, 1933, when repre
sentatives of all the colonial powers in Africa plus observers such as P. G. Van Tienhoven and John C. Phillips convened in the House of Lords to open the London Conference for the Protection of African Fauna and Flora. After a week's deliberations, a nineteen-article convention emerged for final signing. It expressed a determination to increase the number of national parks and what were termed "strict natural reserves." In contrast to the parks, where tourism but not hunting was allowed, the strict reserves banned all human visitation except that of qualified scientists under carefully regulated conditions. Such a policy obviously would not generate much revenue from nature tourism. For the Belgian delegates, at least, this had not been a concern previously. Their Albert National Park was closed to all but scientists, and the Belgians believed that tourism should be subordinated to the right of wild plants and animals to exist for their own sake. This departure from the anthropocentrism normally present in nature protection was unusual. The other delegates insisted that enjoyment by people was the only legitimate reason for protecting nature. Most nature importers would have agreed. The concept of deriving pleasure merely from the knowledge that a place or species was protected had little support in 1933.

The London Convention went on to urge the protection with game laws of animals outside the parks and reserves. An attempt was made to regulate the trade in animal trophies. The signatories agreed to prohibit certain hunting methods such as the shooting of game from cars and airplanes. Two lists designated animals deserving total protection and those which should be killed only occasionally and under special licensing procedure. Unfortunately, when it came to enforcement the convention temporized badly. Local African authorities were accorded the right to set aside the restrictions for a variety of reasons. A clause that anticipated Alaskan policy allowed natives to continue hunting where they had hunted before. In the end, the resolutions contained in the London Convention were not law but advocacy, and even that function crumbled as the Second World War approached.

The final act in the second surge of interest in international nature protection occurred in 1940 just before the European war became worldwide. The Pan-American Union provided the institutional mechanism for preservationists from the various American nations to meet in Washington, D.C. On October 12 a draft convention emerged. The Pan-American document reaffirmed the London Convention of 1933 but went further in its identification of the kinds of reserves that the contracting governments would attempt to establish. Along with national parks and what the Washington conferees called "strict wilderness reserves," the articles called for the establishment of national reserves where resource exploitation and preservation would theoretically coexist. Another new category went beyond the other three in completely prohibiting visitation even for recreational purposes. The United States ratified the articles on April 23, 1941. Then came the war.

After the Second World War the movement for international unity that gave rise to the United Nations provided a favorable climate of opinion for the rebirth and growth of global nature protection. Once again a coterie of nature importers took steps to protect their interests in foreign countries. The Swiss took the lead by hosting a conference in Brunnen on June 30, 1947. A provisional International Union for the Protection of Nature emerged. On September 30 of the following year, Julian Huxley, the Director-General of UNESCO and a classic example of the British nature importer, engineered a meeting at Fontainebleau in France. Eighteen governments, seven international organizations, and 109 national nature protection organizations participated. On October 5, 1948, they completed a constitution. Its preamble defined the object of the new organization as nothing less than "the preservation of the entire world biotic environment." The stated reason behind this objective was the dependence of human civilization upon renewable natural resources. Yet it was clear that the Fontainebleau conference had amenity values as well as practical considerations in mind. The second paragraph in the preamble set forth as axiomatic that "natural beauty is one of the higher common


denominators of spiritual life.” The statement went on to stress the value of wild life and wilderness areas and to champion “national parks, nature reserves, . . . and wild life refuges.” According to the constitution, there were “social, educational and cultural reasons” for protecting nature along with economic ones. The organization, known after 1956 as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), attempted to cover both bases. But a utilitarian interest in “soils, water [and] forests” always seemed to be a means to the end of gaining wider support for the preservation of the wild places and wild things that delighted nature importers.44

Evidence for this slant of the IUCN appeared in its early and continuing emphasis on vanishing species and national parks. A Survival Service Commission emerged from the IUCN’s 1949 conference at Lake Success, New York. Its work in documenting species led in 1966 to the first edition of the Red Data Book, a worldwide listing of threatened birds, animals, and later, plants. The format was loose-leaf to permit periodic updating if the status of a species improved or declined. To minimize the possibility of species extinction the World Wildlife Fund had been organized in 1961 in Switzerland. Although not formally affiliated, the Fund acted symbiotically with IUCN, raising money for IUCN projects and sharing a headquarters in Morges, Switzerland.45 The caliber of the Fund’s leaders and their money-raising capacities were impressive. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, first president of the World Wildlife Fund, obtained ten million dollars from a thousand select individuals. In return they received a print of a bald eagle and an invitation to tour East Africa or the Galapagos Islands. Significantly, most of the contributors began their interest in wildlife conservation on importing trips like these. Prince Bernhard’s experience included several hunting safaris in Africa in the 1950s. On each successive visit he noted a decline in the number of animals. “Where once I saw thousands,” the Prince recalled, “I found only a few hundred, then a mere handful of even the most common animals.”46 The response of this nature importer was to protect his pleasure through the World Wildlife Fund.

Encouraging the formation and maintenance of national parks and other kinds of nature reserves was the second major emphasis of the IUCN. Its Athens meeting in 1958 launched the International Commission on National Parks which, in turn, undertook the preparation of the United Nations List of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves.47 The American, Harold J. Coolidge, and the IUCN’s Secretary from Belgium, Jean-Paul Harroy, headed the effort. The first compilations were ready in time for the First World Conference on National Parks held in Seattle beginning on July 30, 1962. At this gathering of 145 delegates from 63 countries, which the IUCN organized, the themes of nature importing and exporting were much in evidence, as in the keynote address of the American Secretary of the Interior, Stewart L. Udall. Udall explained how his countrymen initially bemoaned the way in which resources like forests, game, and minerals were locked up in national parks. But later they discovered “that the income from providing services to visitor-tourists has equaled or surpassed whatever sums might have been gained exploiting these park resources.” Udall predicted that with improvements in air travel, the nations of East Africa would find that “the world’s travelers [to the parks] will add far more to their economic growth than would any alternate use of these lands.” Later in the conference an entire session detailed the economic values of preserved wild nature. In fact, the economic argument had been one of the four “pillars” that the World Wildlife Fund and the IUCN saw as supporting global nature conservation. The other three ideological supports stemmed from ethical, aesthetic and scientific arguments.48

46. “Royal Conservationist,” The New Yorker, 50 (December 1, 1974), 42.
47. The most complete effort to date is Jean-Paul Harroy, ed., United Nations List of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves, 2nd ed. (Brussels, 1971). Supplements have been issued as IUCN publications, new series, no. 47 (1973) and no. 29 (1974).
Neither the IUCN nor the World Wildlife Fund had the power to coerce sovereign states into protecting nature. More subtle means of persuasion had to be employed. *The Red Data Book*, the United Nations List of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves, and the First World Conference on National Parks endeavored to make nations proud of having national parks and protected rare species. It would be shameful, in the eyes of the world, the implicit argument ran, to destroy wilderness needlessly just as it would be to wreck Chartres cathedral or the Taj Mahal. A truly civilized society protected its natural as well as its cultural treasures. If there was money to be made in the process from nature tourism, so much the better. Unless such arguments influenced people, the importers realized, their hopes of protecting nature in the less developed countries were slim.

Africa became the principal testing ground of these methods. Prior to the 1960s and the independence of the black African states, nature protection was exclusively the concern of white colonials. In British East Africa white game wardens like Blayney Percival and A. T. A. Ritchie, supported by the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire, attempted to defend the shaky game reserves. The London Convention of 1933 raised hopes briefly, but when Colonel Mervyn Cowie returned to his family home near Nairobi in 1936 he found a hopeless situation. The native people simply ignored the reserves, and most of the colonial administrators did not care. The wildlife near Nairobi was vanishing rapidly. Cowie labored to arouse public opinion among the white settlers, and, on December 24, 1946, succeeded in securing the establishment of Nairobi National Park. Others followed, of which Tsavo (1948), Mount Kenya (1949), and the Serengeti (1951) were the most important. Cowie and his colleagues knew full well that these royal national parks were established by whites for whites. They were, in Cowie's words, "cultured persons' playgrounds." The natives had little interest in the parks; indeed, the idea of establishing parks and reserves in Africa in the first place had been to protect nature from the natives. For this reason the prospect of relinquishing the colonies to autonomous native governments frightened white preservationists like Cowie. "Less than a lifetime ago," he fumed in 1961, "the progenitors of these same people who shout for freedom were bargaining with my father to buy and eat his porters." It appeared unlikely to Cowie that the parks would survive independence, particularly with native populations rising as rapidly as their ambitions for a higher material standard of living.  

The same concern motivated the extraordinary German nature importer Bernhard Grzimek. An eminent zoologist and director of the Frankfurt Zoo, Grzimek had become aware in the 1950s that Africa, "the ultimate and last paradise of all our yearnings," was in trouble as far as wilderness was concerned. He determined to do what he could to arouse public opinion throughout the world, reasoning in a manner strange to politicians and natives but familiar to nature importers that "Africa really belongs to all who take comfort from the thought that there are still wild animals and virgin lands on earth." Although he did not take a leading role in its work, Grzimek used the same metaphor as the World Wildlife Fund: an ark, built by people who cared, to save wild animals from the rising flood of human numbers and aspirations.

On December 11, 1957, Grzimek and his son, Michael, took off from Frankfurt in a zebra-striped single-engine plane to try to save what they had come to love since their first trip to Africa six years before. Their target was the Serengeti Plain of Kenya and Tanzania and its amazing concentrations of grazing animals and predators. The Serengeti was a national park, but it existed mainly on paper. Maps and boundaries were vague, and no one knew how many animals used the range or what their migratory movements were. Moreover, as Alan Moorhead wrote in the introduction to Grzimek's account of the trip, African authorities "are decided that the interests of human beings are paramount, and that wherever human beings are in conflict with wild life it is the wild life that must go."

The only hope in this "dismal story," Moorhead continued, is the small group of people "determined to make one final outcry before the Serengeti is irrevocably lost." If these nature importers who were "committed to the idea that human beings are not the only living creatures who have rights upon this earth" could "arouse not
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only the interest but the conscience" of political authorities, the tide might be halted if not turned.\(^5\)

This was the mission of the Grzimeks. They hoped that their flight and survey would concentrate international interest, and money, on East Africa. Their several trips, their book *Serengeti Shall Not Die*, their films, and, tragically, the crash and death of Michael Grzimek on January 10, 1959, while continuing the aerial inventory of wildlife did much to make Serengeti a familiar word in world nature appreciation circles. In addition, Bernhard Grzimek founded the Serengeti Research Institute, based in the national park, where a group of predominantly non-African scientists studied wildlife ecology. With a normal audience of thirty-five million Europeans, Grzimek's television specials raised large sums for the Institute and for international nature-philanthropy organizations such as Friends of the Serengeti. Much of the money became direct gifts (Grzimek did not hesitate to call them bribes) to the African governments. But despite his success as Europe's leading nature entrepreneur, Grzimek remained pessimistic. He hoped that in regard to nature conservation Africans would learn from "our mistakes and our sins." He realized, however, that as in Europe and America, the learning process might take generations. In the meantime, Grzimek worried whether the newly independent Africans would destroy the whole structure of nature protection "with one stroke of the pen."\(^2\) As an archetypical nature importer, Grzimek understood that tourism was nature's best hope in Africa. I am "bringing you the tourists," he reminded Kenyans. "There were sixty thousand Germans in your country last year, and in this way I helped bring many thousands of marks into your country."\(^3\) The end of the game meant the end of the tourists and the marks. Nobody, Grzimek explained, would come to Africa to see overcrowded villages and coffee plantations. Wild animals were money in the bank.

Julian Huxley shared Bernhard Grzimek's special concern for Africa. His 1961 report set forth in classic form the credo of the nature importer: "Africa's wild life belongs not merely to the local inhabitants but to the world, not only to the present but to the whole future of mankind."\(^4\) Huxley regarded the great African herds as one of the world's most valuable scientific resources, but he also stressed their cultural importance. To destroy Africa's wildlife would be comparable, in his view, to tearing down the Sistine Chapel or burning the Mona Lisa.

Fully aware that nature exporting and importing was the key to global nature protection, Julian Huxley explained that the main market for Africa's wildness was the citizenry of industrialized countries. Increasing numbers of Europeans and Americans, he wrote in 1961, will need to "escape ... overcrowded cities, urban sprawl, noise, smog, boring routine, deprivation of contact with nature, and a general over-mechanization of existence." Huxley hoped that in time local African opinion could be enlisted on behalf of nature preservation, but, at least in the short run, he knew that nature protection would be the responsibility of foreigners. The Swahili word *nyama*, he noted, means both wild animals and meat. The great majority of Africans saw no value in wildlife other than as raw material for the stew pot or trophy salesroom. With independence in East and Central Africa just a few years away, Huxley also feared reaction against the strong aura of colonialism that surrounded the national park concept. Africans could not be blamed for regarding the national parks and game reserves as the play-grounds of white men because that is what they had always been. Huxley also heard Africans complain: "You white man have killed all your wolves and bears: why do you want us Africans to preserve our lions and elephants?" The implication was that Africa, too, should have a chance to modernize and industrialize.\(^5\)

The Englishman used a concise formula to answer these objections: "Profit, Protein, Pride and Prestige." Tourists supplied the first; carefully managed game cropping the second. The two less tangible reasons derived from having something that the whole world admired. Shame also figured in Huxley's argument. The almost independent African nations wanted respect, and Huxley made it clear that "in the modern world ... a country without a


\(^{53}\) Hayes, "The Last Place," p. 75.


\(^{55}\) Huxley, *Conservation of Wild Life and Natural Habitats*, pp. 88, 93.
National Park can hardly be recognized as civilized." If Africans abolished their parks they would "shock the world and incur the reproach of barbarism and ignorance." Since this was indeed a fear of many Africans, the point was persuasive. Huxley did not add that his own nation established its first national park only in 1949, centuries after its wilderness vanished. Nor did he acknowledge that for more than fifty years the principal object of the national park movement in England was, in reality, Africa.

As Mervyn Cowie, Bernhard Grzimek, and Julian Huxley recognized, the key to saving wild nature in Africa lay in transferring a sense of responsibility from the white colonists to the new native leaders. With this express purpose in mind, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature launched its African Special Project in 1960. The first major achievement was the staging, in September 1961, of the "Symposium on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States." Known as the "Arusha Conference" for the city in Tanganyika (later Tanzania) where it met, the gathering had a clear task: nature importers wanted to encourage nature exporters. The highlight of the conference was the Arusha Manifesto signed by Julius K. Nyerere, Prime Minister of Tanganyika. It declared that Africans were concerned about protecting wild creatures and wild places for aesthetic as well as economic reasons. The conclusion of the manifesto acknowledged the export-import relationship by noting the stake of "the rest of the world" in Africa's wilderness and soliciting international assistance in the form of "specialized knowledge, trained manpower and money." On September 18, 1963, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya invited "other nations, and lovers of nature throughout the world" to help his newly independent government honor its pledge to conserve wildlife and wilderness. These statements called the bluff of the nature importing nations. If they wanted another nation to save its wildlife for their enjoyment, they would have to make the sacrifices inevitably entailed by preserving economically worthwhile. As Boyce Rensberger has understood, it was a clear challenge to the developed nations to put up or shut up.

Words acquired substance as nature importers sought to protect their interests in Africa. The work of the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation with headquarters in Washington, D.C., is a case in point. Organized in 1961 in the aftermath of the Arusha Conference by Russell Train, a wealthy American safari enthusiast and environmentalist, the Foundation's purpose was "to provide the chance for education in management of wildlife to the men in whose hands its destiny has been placed." Its first undertaking was the College of African Wildlife Management located at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. The African students received professional training in park administration and wildlife ecology. Graduates of the college, such as David Babu, soon held most of the key park jobs in East Africa. A second foreign-supported college at Garova in Cameroon supports conservation education in French-speaking West Africa.

Also interested in raising the public consciousness regarding nature protection, the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation joined with the East African Wild Life Society and the Elsa Wild Animal Appeal, two other predominantly non-African organizations, to sponsor the Wildlife Clubs of Kenya. Intended to interest African school children in wildlife conservation, the clubs feature films, lectures, essay contests and, as special treats, trips to national parks that most young Africans have never seen. Another way of training Africans in nature preservation methods was to finance their education abroad. Perez Olindo of Kenya is an example. The generosity of American nature importers enabled Olindo to complete a degree in zoology and wildlife management at Michigan State University. In 1966 his efforts earned him recognition from the Washington (D.C.) Safari Club as Conservationist

56. Ibid., p. 94.
57. Gerald G. Watterson, ed., Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States (Morges, Switzerland, 1963), p. 13. For Nyerere's even more explicit commentary on nature protection and an insight into his personal opinion see the epigraph to this chapter.
58. Declaration by the President H. E. Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, September 18, 1963 (Files of the Ministry for Natural Resources, Nairobi, Kenya).
of the Year. Olindo was fully aware that not only scholarships and awards but the financial and political leverage needed to protect African animals came from outside Africa. Indeed, his repeated recourse to American and European contacts cost him political support, and ultimately his job, in nationalistic Kenya. But Olindo continued to encourage nature importing. In 1975 he told the Earthcare Conference in New York City that Americans frustrated in their attempts to establish a prairie national park in Kansas or Nebraska should transfer their efforts to the Serengeti Plains. Buy land in Africa, Olindo urged his American audience, and put it into a park.64

Though Olindo's idea had serious political obstacles to overcome, Americans could respond easily to the appeal of American television personality Bill Burrud for donations to purchase a helicopter to deter poachers in Tsavo National Park, Kenya. The idea originated in 1973 when Burrud talked with Ted Goss, Chief Warden at Tsavo. Goss said that poaching was wiping out the park's big game. Burrud responded by making a film, "Where Did All the Animals Go?" which appeared on American and Canadian television along with an appeal for donations for a spotlight-equipped police helicopter that could land right next to a kill and arrest poachers. Nearly $100,000 came in and in August 1975, the helicopter began its patrols. Most of the contributions were in small amounts. A note that accompanied one $5 donation simply said, "You can't xerox an elephant."63

Government-to-government aid also helped African nature protection in the period of transition from colony to independent nation. One form was the United States National Park Service's "International Short Course." Offered annually since 1965, the program has taken park leaders from seventy countries on both field and classroom exploration of the national park idea. Perez Olindo participated in the 1965 seminar.62 Another aid program found teams of park experts on loan to African governments. Frequently private donors facilitated these undertakings. In 1967, for instance, the Virgil and Judith Stark Foundation of New York financed the study of a potential park on Mount Kilimanjaro by U.S. National Park Service officers. In 1972, the government of Norway undertook an extensive aid program to Tanzania on behalf of the Kilimanjaro park plan. Recently the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation has collaborated with the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to send American park planners to every park and reserve in Kenya. Other governments support nature protection in Africa through the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which has taken a special interest in the economics of game cropping and of tourism.64

Ruben J. Olembo, a scientist with the United Nations Environment Program and a member of Kenya's national parks board, summarizes the experience of his nation with nature exporting.65 As an African in Kenya's public schools in the 1950s, Olembo remembers that his teachers told him that national parks and game reserves were white men's toys, symbols of hated colonialism. Everyone expected that the coming of independence (for Kenya in 1963) would mean the end of nature protection. Wildlife was a "bloody nuisance," an obstacle to development which should be removed quickly and completely. But in the early 1960s the big jets, crammed with tourists, began to arrive at Nairobi. The white people they carried were not colonists or businessmen anxious to exploit Africans. Many were not even hunters. The new breed simply wanted to see wild animals, and to the surprised but de-
lighted natives they would pay plenty for the privilege." In Olembo's opinion it was this realization, not any newfound love of nature, that saved the parks in the early 1960s. Tourism, which rose through that decade to become the first or second source of foreign exchange in many African nations, also explains the 1968 African Convention for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. Thirty-eight African heads of state signed the document, which superseded the London Convention of 1935. Significantly, the 1968 agreement was as much an African product as the 1953 was European. The exporters had learned what the importers long knew: the nature business was good business.

As a postscript to the African experience with nature protection, the 1974 comment of Lawrence Kinyua, a Kenyan schoolboy, is revealing. Concluding an essay for the wildlife club organized by his teachers, Kinyua wrote a prayer: "I would like the almighty God to bless our wild animals to increase more abundantly so that the affinity of tourists for our prospering country is increased." Twenty years before the schoolboy Ruben J. Olembo had been taught that there was no value in colonial relics like game reserves and that they would disappear after independence. In two decades the economics of the world nature market had revolutionized some African attitudes. There was no guarantee that this would be enough. The future of wild nature in a nation whose population is doubling every twenty-five years is precarious. Even with Kenya's May 1977 ban on all sport hunting, many anticipate the end of the game as human ambitions encroach on open space. There are not, after all, very many buffalo in Iowa or Kansas, but, then again, there was no massive, jet-propelled nature tourism to make buffalo contribute to the economies of these areas in the 1860s.

67. Philip Thresher, "Could Wild Animals Pay to Survive?" (unpublished manuscript, April, 1975); Thresher, "The Present Value of an Amboseli Lion." The studies are based on Thresher's computer-simulation model of the costs and benefits of wildlife viewing undertaken for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.


Yet even as nature tourism increases, doubts remain about its effectiveness in preserving wilderness. Even nonhunting tourism is not always compatible with preservation. Those who can afford to import nature are, in general, older people unprepared to rough it in the wilds. They demand hotels, restaurants, roads, motorized vehicles, and small towns of supporting servants, all located, more often than not, inside the park or reserve." This luxury tourism yields the biggest economic rewards for the nature exporters. Backpackers are notoriously low spenders, preferring self-sufficiency to service. Roadless wilderness does not generate much revenue, yet this kind of environment is precisely what some importers and most scientists accord the highest value. If the only reason for a park is to make money, restrictions on revenue-producing tourism, even in the cause of protecting nature, are unlikely.

A second argument against tourism as the mainstay of global nature protection centers on the final distribution of the importers' money. Although local people are supposed to be compensated for what they forgo in income by not developing wilderness, the
bulk of the tourist revenue goes to entrepreneurs from the developed world. The extreme examples are the cruise ships such as those Lindblad Travel sends to wild places throughout the world. The modest sums spent on shore by the passengers for souvenirs and postcards do not constitute a strong argument for protecting nature. The economics of land-based tours work out better for native people, but it is still foreign-owned airline companies, hotel chains, and travel agents who chiefly benefit. On a forty-four day, $3,600 trip on a wild river in Peru, Amazon Expeditions, headquartered in Erie, Pennsylvania, does not even buy its food locally. Each member of the trip is sent a bag of foodstuffs before leaving the United States. The consumption of local goods and services is limited to a few nights' lodging and the services of a local truck and driver before and after the river trip. Hydropower developers wishing to dam the river can plausibly claim that nature importing does not constitute a viable economic alternative. In addition, political disturbances, such as those of the late 1970s which closed all of Uganda and the Kenya-Tanzania border to tourists, could completely remove the protection to nature afforded by nature tourism.

The alternative, and the ultimate extension of nature importing, is outright ownership, or at least control, of important natural environments. Though it is unfair to think of international collaboration to this end as neocolonial, its purpose is much the same as that of the earlier European park promoters in South Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Kenya. The central concept of what might be thought of as an international park is found as early as 1834 in the statement of Andrew Reed and James Natheson regarding one of North America's scenic wonders. "Niagara," these tourists wrote, "does not belong to Canada or America. Such spots should be deemed the property of civilized mankind." Since Niagara Falls certainly did in the traditional sense "belong" to Canada and the United States, the logic behind this and many similar statements needs clarification. Apparently Reed and Natheson looked on Niagara as a scenic resource of value to all mankind. By geographical accident the Falls happened to be in Canada and the United States, but this did not give these nations the right to destroy them. Every human being, now and for all time, has a stake in such treasures and individual nations must not be allowed to act unilaterally in regard to their future. Pressed to the logical conclusion, this line of reasoning would authorize the world community to intervene, forcibly if necessary, to halt the destructive activities of a country within its own borders. Institutionalizing this idea was extremely difficult since it touched upon the uniquely sensitive issue of sovereignty.

Moreton Frewen, the English aristocrat, anticipated the international park in the 1870s when he bought land in Wyoming to protect it from American frontiersmen. Recent world control of natural treasures began in 1956: Masai incursions upon Serengeti National Park, and the prospect of African independence, led nature conservationists like Bernhard Grimek to propose to buy or otherwise arrange for the Serengeti to be made international property under the United Nations. Nothing came of the idea, but in the following decade the Sierra Club discussed the prospects for an Earth International Park, while Friends of the Earth preferred Earth National Park. In 1971 Wildlife Conservation International arranged with the government of Zambia to manage, under a twenty-five year lease, the Zambia International Wildlife Park. The Nature Conservancy, based in Arlington, Virginia, preferred to work by purchasing or receiving actual title to endangered natural environments. After two decades of concentration on the United States, the Nature Conservancy began in the mid-1970s to look into the acquisition of title to lands in foreign countries. In 1975 the Conservancy received a gift of 950 acres of pristine tropical rainforest on the Caribbean island of Dominica, leased to the Dominican government for management as a park. Much broader in scope is the Man and the Biosphere Program (MAB) set in motion under the auspices of UNESCO in 1970. Participating nations link appropriate sites into a worldwide network of ecologically significant

Russell Train took the platform to offer another idea: the world heritage trust. Train explained it as an international extension of the national park concept. Certain natural features had such outstanding value “that they belong to the heritage of the entire world.” As examples Train cited Mount Everest, the Galapagos Islands, the Serengeti Plain, Angel Falls in Venezuela, the Grand Canyon of Arizona, and certain animal species like the mountain gorilla. Train’s idea was to marshal the world’s financial, technical, and managerial resources on behalf of these places and life forms.

Moving toward institutionalization of the world heritage idea, UNESCO drafted a convention in November 1972, and the United States became the first nation to ratify it on December 7, 1972. Not until September 1978, however, did eleven nations actually place areas on the “World Heritage List.” Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, Everglades, and Redwoods national parks are among the American listings. Forty-two countries have ratified the convention to date, and more areas will be added to the list, but the degree of protection obtained thereby is not great. The chronic problem is that national sovereignty is left unchallenged. Participating nations may delete areas listed at will or, for that matter, denounce the entire convention. There are no reprisals. What a nation does to nature within its own borders remains its own business as Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment made clear in Stockholm in 1972. Yet the world heritage concept does give more recognition than ever before to the international significance of natural environments and the international responsibility for their protection.

The economics inherent in trading wild nature are not, to be sure, the whole story. Other motives—some would say better or higher ones—exist for protecting the natural world, and the less developed nations may eventually evolve economically and techni-

79. Elliott, Second World Conference on National Parks, pp. 443-44.
Wilderness and the American Mind

EPILOGUE

A Future for Wilderness?

There is no more new frontier, we have got to make it here.

The Eagles, 1976

A millennium is almost meaningless geologically; in terms of human history, however, it is an understandable unit of time. What strains the imagination is the thought of the changes a millennium will bring to wilderness, and to civilization, on this planet. Who in the 1960s could have foreseen a world in which oil is piped from Alaska, the planet’s mightiest rivers are thoroughly regulated, and recreational backpacking threatens to love designated wilderness areas to death? We may be in no better position today to predict the state of wilderness on this planet in 2980. Extrapolation, however, is intriguing.

Civilization, powered by an increasingly sophisticated technology, will certainly continue to modify and control the earth unless man restrains it. Wilderness will be a casualty or will be eliminated altogether. Within ten centuries the placement of huge superdomes at sixty degrees north and south latitudes could permit billions to live in comfort in polar regions. The idea of walking on the moon was no more fanciful to people in 982, or even 1950. Deep seabed mining and extensive mariculture could erode another world reservoir of wildness. And what impact on wilderness, and particularly the wilderness experience, will instant and omnipresent transportation and communications have? The possibility of taking the afternoon off in Detroit and fishing Alaska’s Brooks Range may be taken for granted by sportsmen of the thirtieth century. Again, for perspective, transcontinental travel in four hours was literally incredible just a few generations ago.

1. In this regard John Platt argues that the changes in human capabilities since World War II constitute the greatest evolutionary leap in the history of life on earth: “The Acceleration of Evolution,” The Futurist, 15 (1981), 14–25. Also relevant is F. Fraser Darling and John P. Milton, eds., Future Environments of North America (Garden City, N.Y., 1966). The fact that this volume is already dated substantiates some of its findings.