Montaigne
Part II: Parts
1-2 The basic principle of skeptical arguments
In the next paragraph on Pg. 74 Montaigne introduces perhaps the most
basic principle of skeptical arguments. Skeptics in the ancient world
were inclined to distinguish between appearance and reality, much as Plato
did, and to hold (again much as Plato did) that in respect to appearance
all we ever have is opinion, while if we grasped reality, what we would
have would be knowledge. So:
| KNOWLEDGE is of
| REALITY |
| OPINION
relates to | APPEARANCE |
What is the difference between grasping reality and appearance? One
mark of that difference is the assumption made by both Platonists and
skeptics alike that reality is determinately one way or another, that a
thing has one property or another -- it is one way rather than another.
The world of appearance, on the other has, is a world of change in which
things are sometimes one way sometimes another, this in relation to A but
not in relation to B and so on. Perhaps a pure example of the determinate
character of reality is what Plato says about the Idea or Form of Beauty
in the Symposium:
...a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing
and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not beautiful in one point of
view and ugly in another, or at one time or in one relation or at
one place beautiful, at another time or in another relation or at another
place ugly, as if beautiful to some and-ugly to others, or in the
likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame,
or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being,
as for example, in an animal, or in heaven or in earth, or in any
other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting,
which without diminution and without increase, or any change...
So, if both of us see the form of Beauty -- which is the essence of the
beauty in all beautiful things, we will see exactly the same thing. This
is what marks it out as being real, rather than apparent beauty. Apparent
beauty is beautiful from one pers pective but not from another, beautiful
at one time but not another, beautiful in one place but not another and so
on. The skeptics agree with Plato completely about this. The difference
between the skeptics and Plato is that while Plato was convinced it was
possible to grasp reality through the exercise of reason and philosophy,
the skeptics deny this possibility.
Now let us turn to the world of the senses where we drink wine and find
that wood and iron have particular textures. If each of us were to
encounter these things and find in them the same properties, we might
conclude that we were getting at the reality of things. But it does not
work this way. For a variety of reasons we see the same things in
different ways. Now the assumption that reality is determinate means that
conflicting appearances cannot be true. If we see things differently,
both of us cannot be correct. One or the other (or both) of us have
failed to grasp the truth. And we need a criterion to decide which one of
us has got it right. And that takes you back to the problem of the
criterion. So, we cannot accept appearances because they conflict, and
we cannot judge between the conflicting opinions based on them, because we
do not have a criterion. Consider now what Montainge says:
That things do not lodge in us in their
own form and essence, or make their own entry into us by their own power
and authority, we see clearly enough. Because, if that were so, we should
receive them in the same way: wine would be the same in the mouth of a
sick man as in the mouth of a healthy man; he who has chapped or numbed
fingers would find the same hardness in the wood or iron he handles as
another.(Pg. 74)
Montaigne goes on to point out the implications. On the one hand, if
we all grasped reality we would have universal consent. On the other,
what is actually the case is "that men are in agreement about nothing."
(Pg. 75) He then goes on to point out that this kind of disagreement
occurs not only between different people but even within ourselves. He
then points out that from this knowledge of the mobility of his own
opinions he has "accidentally engendered in myself a certain constancy of
opinions, and have scarcely altered my original and natural ones." In
particular, "...I have, by the Grace of God, kept myself intact, without
agitation or disturbance of conscience, in the ancient beliefs of our
religion, in the midst of so many sects and divisions which our century
had produced." Montainge is telling us that by the grace of God he
has remained a faithful Catholic and so here we have the alliance between
skepticism and Catholicism."
Parts 3-5 The
humanist and scientific skeptical crises
In the next couple of paragraphs we get a reference to the humanist
skeptical crisis and the skeptical crisis in natural philosophy. ---
Montaigne's opinions are taken first one way, then another by the ancient
authors -- "I find each one right in his turn, although they contradict
one another." Rather clearly, this is not a satisfactory situation, if
you want to decide which one is right. (Remember reality is determinate!)
Montaigne then goes on to consider two conflicting propositions, which we
may slightly simplify to the following:
P1. The sun moves about the earth.
P2. The earth moves around the sun while the sun remains still.
Here is a quiz. When you are convinced you can answer the following
questions, take the quiz by clicking on the link below:
| Quiz: Skepticism and
Astronomy |
|---|
- If reality is determinate both P1 and P2 may be true. (T/F)
- Suppose that the evidence equally supports both hypotheses represented
by P1 and P2 and you have no criterion to determine which of these is
true. What should you conclude? There being no criterion to decide
between these two propositions was very much the state of things in the
1570s when Montaigne wrote this. The telescope had not yet been invented
or pointed at the stars by Galileo -- this would occur in 1609 -- and even
that would not resolve the problem decisively.)
a. P1 should be accepted as true, while P2 should be
rejected as false.
b. Both P1 and P2 should be accepted as true.
c. P2 should be accepted as true, while P1 should be
rejected as false.
d. One should suspend judgement on whether P1 or P2
is true
e. One should hold that both P1 and P2 are false.
|
After giving this skeptical argument in regard to astronomy, Montaigne
goes on to consider medicine, physics and finally geography. The
arguments all turn on the idea that things change, that new things may be
discovered, but that we have no reason to trust the new. The arguments in
regard to each of the four topics are pretty much the same. What is
interesting about the geography argument is that it shows that the
discovery of the new world and the voyages of discovery had a direct
impact on certain philosophical issues. By showing that the ancients were
wrong in their geography it reinforced Renaissance skepticism.