Market Orientation in Fisheries Management
By T. Trondsen
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses motivation factors for market oriented value adding of limited fish resources. Analytical, the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SPC) model is combined with the market orientation concept. The analysis shows that those most established fisheries management systems as Olympic style, licenses and transferable quotas and licenses are reducing the motivation for market oriented value adding and for increased resource rent. An improved management model is introduced, which combines Seasonal Quota Auction (SQA), licenses and governmental quota allocation instruments. Seasonal quotas (short term leasing contracts) can be auctioned on credit, where the quota price is the resource rent for redistributing through fisher's co-operatives, regions, ITQ owners, government or as bonus to all fishers. The model makes it possible to motivate market-orientated value adding, cost-efficiency, quota allocation to target fisher groups and fish stock sustainability. In contrast to a pure ITQ model, this model offers solutions for an administrative quota allocation, which is improving motivation of rent generating from the most market oriented and efficient fishers without privatizing the fish resources on few private hands. This management model is expected to impose increased social costs for the less competitive in each fisher group, generate both less resource rent and less social costs in the long run compared with free market solutions working without other constraints than maintaining biological TAC.
KEYWORDS: Market orientation, sustainable development, resource rent, fisheries management, institutional economics, fish auctions and fishery marketing
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