On Demand-side approaches to Solving the " Tragedy of High Prices" in Fisheries
By Gregory ValatinABSTRACT
Frequently economists have characterised the causes of overfishing in terms of "the Tragedy of the Commons" model, even though equating common property with open access is misleading. Such resource problems could more accurately be characterised as a "Tragedy of High Prices" associated with landings prices relative to fishing costs being higher than socially optimal.
Representing an attempt to counter economic incentives to overfish, fisheries management relates primarily to problems of rationing fishing opportunities. Despite having desirable properties of avoiding the establishment of barriers to new entrants and associated distributional effects, reducing regulatory discards, and creating a source of finance which could be used to tackle problems such as over-capitalisation, solutions based upon demand-side regulation have been much neglected in the literature.
Reflecting underlying objectives, differences in the economic behaviour of fishermen faced with price changes, and efficiency and distributional issues associated with demand-side regulation are discussed. In enhancing compliance, adoption within a co-management framework is considered.
This paper was written in the context of a EU-funded research fellowship.
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