Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency in Past and Present institutions of Governance in PNW Salmon Fisheries
By Sara Singleton
ABSTRACT
The paper explores three interrelated questions related to institutional design: the roles of states and communities in creating and maintaining institutions designed to resolve commons problems arising from the use of natural resource systems; the substantive content of such institutions with respect to allocative efficiency and equity; and effects on allocative efficiency of the interactive relationship between, on the one hand, institutions designed specifically to inhibit free-riding, and on other, broader social arrangements such as kinship networks, membership in a community, or levels of social capital, which create expectations of stable, ongoing relations between parties across a number of issue areas. The discussion is illustrated with cases from PNW salmon fisheries, past and present.
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