Individual Transferable Quotas and Bycatch management:
Preliminary Evidence from the New Zealand Experience
By James Sanchirico, Suzi Kerr, and Richard Newell
ABSTRACT
The philosophy of renewable resource management is undergoing a revolution of sorts toward increased consideration of market-based instruments, particularly the use of individual transferable quota (ITQs) for managing fisheries. While ITQs are now implemented in more than 15 countries, many fisherman, environmentalists, and regulators remain opposed to ITQs. This is in spite of the fact that many, if not all of the current ITQ programs are thought to be succeeding in reducing excess capital, halting the "race for fish", and improving resource stewardship. Why then the opposition? One particular view is that ITQs are not appropriate for multi-species fisheries or fisheries where bycatch rates are high. In fact, many advocates for ITQs will concede that multi-species fisheries management and the perplexing bycatch issue are two factors impeding the adoption of new ITQ programs. The difficulties are compounded when the production technology is non-selective, the design of the ITQ system is rigid when it comes to quota "overages" and "underages", the quota market is not operating efficiently, and the uncertainty associated with resource stocks and with species mixing is large. The New Zealand Quota Management System (QMS) manages "bycatch" by allowing vessels to buy quota to offset bycatch. This implies that NZ fishermen are faced with direct monetary costs associated with bycatch that could induce fishermen to alter their production process to reduce bycatch. In this paper, we empirically investigate the New Zealand bycatch system and report preliminary evidence on how much of the NZ bycatch issue is being mitigated through behavioral responses and how much through quota market transactions. Our overall goal is to assess the extent to which incentive-based approaches are more appropriate than traditional command and control input regulations in the management of bycatch.
 View Property Rights: Building Flexibility into Property Rights Systems Session
|
Instructions for authors
