Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish


Income Subsidies and Incentives to Overfish By Erik Poole ABSTRACT Using a two-stage harvesting game, I model the political and economic incentives to overfish in a restricted access common fishery with income supplements. As variable effort is regulated and invariably implies a corner solution, I argue that social choice of lobbying effort becomes the key choice variable by which commercial fishermen continue to press for additional fishing opportunities relative to the regulator's desired catch target. The model helps explain recent fish stock collapses. The analysis also questions the appropriateness of continuing the fishing category of Canadian employment insurance as the regulator embraces a precautionary, risk averse approach to fisheries management. KEYWORDS: restricted access fisheries, unemployment insurance, fishing behaviour, overfishing, Canada Political Economy View Full Paper (PDF file)

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