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Cleaning of Eutrophic Inland Waters for Fishery and Amenities: On the Treatment of Dynamic Aspects in Political Economy Modeling of Statutory Regulations in Polluting Communities

By Ernst-August Nuppenau

ABSTRACT

Inland waters in many regions of the world, such as bigger lakes, long stretching fjords and slowly moving rivers are mostly characterized by big human populations and corresponding activities. These waters are heavily polluted by externalities of the particular communities living close to the waters. Due to the immanent common property problem of the media water and high transaction costs, non-point-pollution is the common feature of many inland waters and eutrophic levels are alarmingly high. By high eutrophic levels, for instance, fishery, drinking water and other services are negatively effected. Concerning causes of pollution, agriculture, subject to overuse of fertilizer and pesticides, is regarded as the main polluter.

Environmental regulations on particular farm practices, such as animal waste and fertilizer application, but also residents activities, such as sewage treatment, seek to minimize shocks that are imposed by eutrophying substance. Enrichment of eutrophying substances are perceived detrimental to the functioning of aquatic ecological systems. Moreover, since many waters already show high concentrations of theses substance, even purification is needed.

In the dynamic environment of eutrophication done by multiple polluters and accumulated over time, damage also depends on stocks and/or flows of pollutants exceeding certain thresholds. The paper presents a model that counts for such thresholds and attributes levels of contribution and thresholds to individuals in a community using a time framework.

The paper applies a combination of dynamic control model, that is optimized by a manager of the common property who seeks to achieve agreed thresholds of cleanness or eutrophic levels of water on the behalf of the community, and a political economy model, that depicts the bargaining process for the establishment of the objective function of the manager. The manager is a partial manager, not a benevolent dictator, but has statutory power to regulate fertilizer application, that impose eutrophication of nutrients by farmers, and harvests of fish, that benefit fishermen. As institutions, the approach investigates a tragedy of the commons, statutory regulations and financial innovations for compensation and transaction costs.


  Political Economy

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