Climate, Uncertainty And The Pacific Salmon Treaty: Insights On The Harvest Management Game
By Kathleen Miller, Gordon Munro, Robert McKelvey, and Peter TyedmersABSTRACT
The period of high productivity in Alaska induced Alaska to fish harder in areas where B.C. salmon are intermingled with Alaskan fish. This caused Alaskan interceptions to increase at a time when Pacific Northwest coho and chinook could least withstand retaliatory actions on the part of the Canadian fleet. The six-year breakdown in efforts to renegotiate fishing regimes under the terms of the Pacific Salmon Treaty may have further jeopardized the troubled southern salmon stocks. Only recently, has the mounting crisis led to a fundamental shift in the approach taken by the two nations to determine their respective salmon-harvest shares. On June 30, 1999, the two nations signed an agreement which, if successfully implemented, may lay the groundwork for a more sustainable cooperative management regime. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding the viability and sustainability of the new Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement. Lessons from the recent period of turmoil may help to identify strengths and weaknesses in the new abundance-based management approach, and may suggest avenues for further negotiations to secure more rational management of Pacific salmon resources.
This paper begins with an analysis of the failure of the previous regime-negotiation process, focusing on the roles played by changing salmon abundance and uncertainty regarding the causes and magnitude of those changes. We employ a simple game-theoretic model to show how climate-related changes in salmon abundance, coupled with differing interpretations of the Treaty's provisions, led to the collapse in cooperation. The paper documents the effects of the Treaty impasse on harvesting patterns, with particular attention to exploitation of coho and chinook stocks.
We then turn to an examination of the new Agreement. We evaluate the benefits and potential pitfalls of the new approach, using insights from the game-theoretic model together with evidence from the first fishing season under the agreement. We also examine concerns that have been raised by the salmon managers who must implement its provisions. Finally, we identify potential opportunities for side-deals to enhance the recovery prospects for southern salmon populations as well as the stability of the new Agreement itself. In particular, we examine the option of side-payments, perhaps by a coalition of Pacific Northwest hydropower, environmental and development interests to Alaskan and B.C. harvesters to secure Asafe-passage@ for endangered Columbia Basin and Puget Sound chinook. This paper examines the feasibility of that option in light of the new abundance-based management framework.
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